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1 Introduction
Recent research has shown how explicitly modelling the network structure of social and economic
relations can provide significant theoretical insights, as well as account for previously unexplained
empirical observations. Relevant areas of application range from labour markets (Calvo-Armentgol,
2004; and Jackson and Calvo-Armengol, 2004), the diffusion of opinions and diseases (Jackson and
Yaariv, 2011), trade and financial markets (Eliott, Golub and Jackson, 2013), R&D collaborations
(Goyal and Moraga Gonzales, 2001), friendship and peer effects identification (Currarini, Jackson
and Pin, 2009, 2010), to the adoption of health related behaviours (Christakis and Fowler, 2002).
Network theory is particularly well-suited to analysing problems where social distance affects
the nature and extent of economic interactions. In a network, agents interact only with a subset of
other agents called the neighbours. For instance, in labour markets, information on job vacancies
mainly flows along social ties. Likewise, our behaviour and habits are affected by those of our
friends, relatives and colleagues with whom we interact and imitate, and whose actions have an
impact on our welfare. It is exactly this local nature of interaction that distinguishes network models
from models based on coalitional relations. More precisely, while in economic coalitions all
members interact with all other members of the coalition, within a network agents may entertain
relations which are not transitive, in the sense that A having a tie with B and B with C does not
imply that A and C are tied.
Research in network economics has addressed two distinct, though strictly related, issues: (i)
how network structures affect the behaviour of social and economic actors; (ii) what incentives
agents face in forming the network by means of link creation and deletion (which in turn begs the
question how these incentives relate to social incentives, and how efficient are the resulting
architectures). Investigation of the above issues has shown that the network structure of career
advice can generate unemployment patterns that match the observed correlation and persistence of
unemployment much better than classical models do. Furthermore, we have learn that the effect of
changing the topology of a social network crucially depends on the strategic features of social
interaction (i.e. whether they are substitutes or complements); and that the ethnic biases in the way
students form friendships originates both from institutional constraints and from preferences that
are not race-blind but favour one’s own ethnic group.
Local interactions and network structures appear to be a prominent feature of many
environmental problems. Without having the ambition to be exhaustive, this paper nonetheless
considers a wide range of issues and potential areas of application, including: (i) the role of
relational networks in the pattern of adoption and the speed of diffusion of green technologies; (ii)
common pool resource problems characterized by a multiplicity of sources and users interlinked by
an extraction network; (iii) the role of social networks in multi-level environmental governance; (iv)
infrastructural networks in the access to and use of natural resources such as oil and natural gas; (v)
the use of networks to describe the internal structure of inter-country relations in international
agreements, and how this affects the stability of cooperation; and (vi) the formation of bilateral
“links” in the process of building up an environmental coalition.
For each of these areas, we examine why and how network economics would be an effective
conceptual and analytical tool, and discuss the main insights that we can foresee. We do this by
reviewing relevant yet still limited contributions within this emerging research field, discussing new
frameworks of analysis, and identifying open issues and questions for future research.
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The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic elements needed to define and
describe networks, and presents some of the key indices that are used to capture the structural
features of a network and to compare different architectures. Section 3 discusses how the network is
likely to affect agents’ actions, behaviours and welfare; and what forces/incentives are behind the
process of network formation. In section 4 we seek to map the linkages between network economics
and the environment by focusing on specific environmental issues and analysing in greater detail
how the use of networks can provide new insights for both theory and practice. Section 5 concludes.
2 Network Economics: Key Features and Concepts
2.1 Definitions
Networks
We define a network starting from a set N of nodes. In applications, nodes usually represent socio
economic agents, such as firms, consumers, countries, etc… A network g can be defined as a subset
of the set of all pairs of elements in N: 𝑔 ⊆ {𝑖𝑗: 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁}. When the order of pairs matters, we
say the network is directed, otherwise we say that the network is undirected (that is, in an
undirected network 𝑖𝑗 ∈ 𝑔 ⟶ 𝑗𝑖 ∈ 𝑔). A pair 𝑖𝑗 ∈ 𝑔 is called a link or a tie. More in general, links
can carry an associated real number that is usually interpreted as the strength of the link. In most
economic applications, however, such weights are set to either 1 (the link is there) or 0 (the links is
absent), and 𝑔 is a non-weighted network. We will denote by 𝑔 − 𝑖𝑗 the network obtained by
deleting the link 𝑖𝑗 from 𝑔, and by 𝑔 + 𝑖𝑗 the network obtained by adding the link 𝑖𝑗 to 𝑔.
An alternative way to represent a network is by means of the adjacency matrix G, whose generic
entry 𝑔!" measures the strength of the link between nodes i and j in g. When the network is
undirected, the adjacency matrix is symmetric; when links are not weighted, the matrix only
!
contains zeros and ones. The generic element 𝑔!"
of the 𝑚 − 𝑡ℎ power of the matrix G counts how
many paths of length 𝑚 are present in 𝑔 between 𝑖 and 𝑗.
The neighbourhood of node 𝑖 in the non-weighted network 𝑔 is the set of nodes that are linked
to 𝑖 in 𝑔. The number of such nodes – called the neighbours of 𝑖 – is called the degree of 𝑖 in 𝑔. If
all nodes are linked to all other nodes we have the complete network. Notable architectures include
(i) minimally connected networks (trees); (ii) regular networks, where all nodes have the same
degree (a special case is the circle, where all nodes have two neighbours); and (iii) core-periphery
architectures, which are networks where a subset of nodes – the core – is linked to all nodes in the
network and the rest of the nodes are only linked to nodes in the core (a special case is the star,
where the core includes a single node). See figure 1.
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Tree

Circle

Star

Figure 1 Example of network architectures
Paths and Connectedness
A walk in the network 𝑔 is a sequence of adjacent links in 𝑔. Formally, a walk is a sequence
{𝑖! 𝑖! , 𝑖! 𝑖! … , 𝑖!!! 𝑖! }   such that 𝑖!!! 𝑖! ∈ 𝑔 for all 𝑝 = 1, … , 𝑚. When such walk exists, we say that
the two nodes 𝑖! , 𝑖! are connected in 𝑔. A walk such that 𝑖! = 𝑖! is called a cycle. When the walk
never goes twice through the same node we have a path. When there are several paths connecting
nodes 𝑖!   𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑖! , we consider the shortest of these paths to define the geodesic distance between
𝑖!   𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑖! as the number of links in this shortest path. We say that the network 𝑔 is connected if for
each pair of nodes there exists a connecting path.
Sub-networks and Components
A sub-network ℎ ⊂ 𝑔 is a network with set of nodes 𝑆 ⊆ 𝑁 and such that 𝑖𝑗 ∈ ℎ ⟶ 𝑖𝑗 ∈ 𝑔. For any
subset 𝑆 ⊂ 𝑁 we define the restriction of 𝑔 to 𝑆 as the sub-network with set of nodes 𝑆 and with the
links that in 𝑔 only involve nodes in 𝑆. The restriction of 𝑔 to 𝑆 is denoted by 𝑔|! . We say that the
subset of nodes 𝑆 ⊂ 𝑁 is connected in g if 𝑔|! is connected. The maximal connected sub-network
of 𝑔 is called a component of 𝑔. By definition, a component ℎ of 𝑔 is such that no link is present in
𝑔 between nodes in the component and nodes outside the component.
2.2 Representing Networks
Networks are mathematically complex structures. We can capture some basic structural properties
and compare different networks by looking at simple indices, whose qualitative features are briefly
described below.
Connectivity
One first measure of network connectivity is the average degree which tells us on average how
many neighbours nodes have. A different type of information is given by the diameter of a network,
which is the maximal geodesic distance between any two nodes. If for instance, the diameter of g is
6, it means that it takes at most 6 steps to go from any node to any other node in the network.
Another related index, the average distance, measures how distant nodes are on average.
4
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Clustering
Within a network, two neighbours of a given node may or may not be themselves neighbours.
When they are, they “close” the triangle of relationships by forming a “cluster”. The degree of
clustering may greatly vary across networks, depending on the nature of the relations described by
links. In a hierarchical organization, for instance, clustering is very low, while in friendships
clustering may tend to be quite high, since common friends often tend to become friends
themselves. A measure of how clustered a network is looks at all the potential triangles in the
networks (a node with two neighbours) and counts the fraction of times that such triangles are
actually closed; a slightly different measures takes this fraction for each node in the network, and
then averages across all nodes.
Centrality
Nodes in a network may have different degrees of “importance” in connecting other nodes. For
instance, a node may be critical in the sense that by removing it from the network, the other nodes
would split into two or more components. Or a node may be important because many of the shortest
paths that connect the other nodes pass through that single node. Or, still, because it is very close to
all other nodes in the network, or to the most important nodes in the network.
Centrality indices have the scope to formally quantify the importance of nodes in the network. A
first basic way to think of centrality is to simply consider how many connections a node has – that
is, taking a node's degree (possibly normalized by the total number of nodes is one wishes to
compare centrality in different network) as an index of centrality. Other notions of centrality make
use of more global information about the position of nodes in the network. Closeness centrality
measures how close a node is to all other nodes in the network, and is given by the inverse of the
sum of a node's distances from all other nodes. Betweeness centrality measures how important is a
node in efficiently connecting other nodes in the network; for a given node 𝑖 this index is given by
the fraction of shortest paths between any two nodes k and j that go through node 𝑖. Eigenvalue
centrality accounts for the type of connections that a node has in the network; it is based on the
(recursive) idea that central nodes are those connected to other central nodes. Finally, Bonachich
Centrality counts all walks that depart from a given node in the network, discounting longer walk
by an exponential factor.
A suggestive illustration of centrality is given in figure 2 – taken from Jackson (2010) –
showing the network of marriages in Renaissance Florence. The Medici family is shown to occupy
a very central position, which has been advocated by some historians as one of the key elements
explaining their surge to political and social power.
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Figure 2 Florentine marriages network. Source: Padgett and Ansell
(1993)
Degree Distributions
While centrality describes features of single nodes as a function of the whole network, other
measures aim at capturing features of the overall distribution of links in the network. The degree
distribution of a network provides information about the fraction of nodes that have any given
degree in the network. Mathematically, it associates with each possible degree d (from 0 to n - 1,
where n is the total number of nodes) the fraction of nodes with degree d in the network under
consideration. It must be noted that although the degree distribution provides useful information on
how evenly distributed connections are in a network (whether, for instance, the network has a
considerable fraction of nodes that act as hubs and of nodes that are poorly connected or,
alternatively, all nodes have more or less the same degree), this measure is silent about other
characteristics such as clustering. Figure 3a gives an example of two networks with the same degree
distribution (degenerate, with all agents having degree of 2), but quite different architectures in
terms of connectivity and clustering.

(a)

(b)

Figure 3a Clustering and degree distribution
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Notable degree distributions are (i) the Poisson distribution, approximating the expected degree
distribution in a purely random network where each link forms with the same given exogenous
probability, and (ii) the scale free (or power law) distribution, which exhibits fatter lower and upper
tails compared to the Poisson, and is generated by models of growing random network where more
connected nodes face better chances to form further links with newly born nodes (as in the
preferential attachment model by Barabasi et al., 1999)). The fraction of agents with degree d is
given by 𝑃 𝑑 = 𝑐𝑑 !! .

2. 3 Welfare, Behaviour and Network Formation
2.3.1 Network Games, Allocation Rules and Efficient Networks
The patterns of social interaction are likely to affect agents’ behaviour, aggregate welfare and
welfare distribution. The traditional models of game theory have been extended to encompass the
structure of local interaction described by the network. In graphical games, agents are assumed to
only interact with their neighbours in the network, whose actions directly enter their payoff function
(compared with traditional game theoretic models where every agents interacts with everyone else).
However, feedbacks are present also between agents who are only indirectly connected in the
network, and each agent’s equilibrium behaviour ends up depending on the entire architecture
rather than only on her neighbourhood. Two broad classes of graphical games are: (i) games with
strategic complements, where an agent’s incentives to act increase with the number (or the share) of
neighbours taking the action; (ii) games with strategic substitutes, where incentives to act decrease
with the number (or share) of neighbours taking the action. Strategic complements well describe
settings where conformism, imitation or other economic mechanisms correlate agents’ behaviour
with their neighbours’; substitutes represent problems where incentives to free ride are present, and
agents substitute their own (costly) action with their neighbours’.
In large networks, agents may have limited knowledge of the overall architecture beyond their
neighbourhood. The class of network games, studied in Galeotti et al. (2007), captures this
incomplete information aspect by assuming that only the overall degree distribution of the network
is common knowledge, and each agent privately knows her own degree, and formulates
expectations about her neighbours’ degrees and behaviour. Within this framework, it is possible to
draw sharp conclusions about the implications of changes in the network’s topology on agents’
behaviour in the classes of games with strategic complements and substitutes.
7
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Using a reduced form approach in line with the cooperative games tradition, we can associate
with each network 𝑔 a value function 𝑣 expressing the total welfare generated by agents in the
network. The real number 𝑣(𝑔) can be thought as the sum of agents payoffs in a game played on 𝑔,
or as the social “pie” that is generated in 𝑔 and that must be distributed among agents. Individual
payoffs, whether they come from non cooperative equilibrium behaviour or from a centralized
mechanism inducing interpersonal transfers of various types, are represented by an allocation rule
𝑎(𝑣, 𝑔), a vector-valued function mapping each economic problem (a pair 𝑣, 𝑔) into a distribution
of the value 𝑣(𝑔). A network 𝑔∗ is said to be efficient with respect to 𝑣 if it maximizes the size of
the pie to be distributed: 𝑔∗ = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥! 𝑣(𝑔).
2.3.2 Link Formation, Stability and Efficiency
The way in which the allocation rule 𝑎(𝑣, 𝑔) shares the total pie among agents determines agents’
incentives to form and sever links. For instance, agent 𝑖 (node 𝑖) in network 𝑔 will have an
incentive to form the link 𝑖𝑗 ∉ 𝑔 if her payoff, as determined by the rule 𝑎(𝑣, 𝑔), would increase in
𝑔 + 𝑖𝑗 compared to 𝑔. Any notion of stability of a network refers to such incentives, and is
therefore defined with respect to the pair (𝑣, 𝑎). Depending on agents’ strategic possibilities to
revise their links we obtain various notions of stability.
One first important issue is whether agents can form links without the consent of their
perspective partners. This modelling choice clearly depends on the specific economic problem one
has in mind, and in particular on whether links are directed or undirected. If links represent
literature citations or Internet page referrals, unilateral link formation is an appropriate assumption.
Mutual consent is instead required in friendships, information sharing, insurance, market
agreements, co-authorship, and in many other socio-economic applications.
A second issue is the extent to which agents are able to coordinate their decision to revise links.
When links can be formed unilaterally, stability can be defined by directly applying the Nash
equilibrium to a suitably defined link formation game. Coordination is instead a crucial issue when
mutual consent is required to form a link, since individual actions are not capable of adding links to
a network. The notion of pairwise stability (Jackson and Wolisnky 1996) assumes that agents can
coordinate to form a profitable link: a stable network obtains when no pair of agents wishes to form
a new link, and no agent wishes to (unilaterally) sever an existing link. Note that pairwise stability
cannot be derived as the Nash equilibrium of a suitable defined link formation game, since: (i)
agents can only sever one of their existing links, and (ii) pairs of agents can jointly deviate from a
network by forming a new link. The notion of Nash-pairwise stability, allowing both the
coordinated objection of pairs of agents and the severance of any number of an agent’s own
connections, is instead a refinement of the Nash equilibrium. The even more demanding notion of
strong stability (Jackson and van den Noweland 2000), assumes that any subset of agents can
coordinate in the joint revision of their links, and possesses similar features to the strong Nash
equilibrium of games in strategic form.
Since an agent’s decisions to add or sever links potentially affect all other agents in the network
(the so called network externalities), decentralized linking decisions are likely to lead to inefficient
networks from a social point of view. Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) have shown that network
formation suffers indeed from a general tension between stability and efficiency. They show that no
allocation rule 𝑎(𝑣, 𝑔) that satisfies natural symmetry and anonymity properties guarantees that the
8
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efficient network will be pairwise stable. Given the limited amount of coordination required by the
pairwise stability notion, this result highlights a serious inconsistency between private and social
incentives in network formation. Other contributions have proposed ways to overcome this tension,
focusing on either mechanism design approaches (Dutta and Mututswami, 2000), or on Coase-like
bargaining procedures (Currarini and Morelli, 2000), or still on general transfers schemes (Bloch
and Jackson, 2007). When spillovers are present across components (a relevant case for
environmental problems, where agents benefits and suffer from action taken by other disconnected
agents), efficiency generally requires the use of contingent transfers that subsidize the formation or
the deletion of those links that are responsible for the spillovers (see Bloch and Jackson, 2007).
3 Mapping the Linkages between Network Economics and the Environment
3.1 Diffusion on Networks: Adoption of Green Technologies and Behaviour

Fraction

Much like behaviours, technologies diffuse through social interactions, since adoption by one agent
(whether an individual, a firm or a country) increases the likelihood that others will become aware
of its existence and potential benefits over the incumbent technology. A wealth of studies, ranging
from sociology to engineering has either modelled or lent empirical support to the idea that
mutually reinforcing choices lead to accelerating diffusion of a behavioural trait or technology once
a critical threshold has been reached. This process is due to slow down by virtue of saturation, once
the pool of adopters is so large that there is little scope for imitation, so that the adoption curve
asymptotes as depicted in figure 4.

Time

Figure 4 An example of S-shaped diffusion curve
Depending on the context, many definitions have been given to the idea that other people’s
actions can reinforce one’s own choices: ‘bandwagon effects’ in fashion-oriented behaviour
(Leibenstein, 1950), individuals’ adoption thresholds (Granovetter, 1978), entrapment (Dixit 2003),
network externalities, social reinforcement, cascades (Watts, 2002), tipping (Gladwell, 2000) and
“positive feedback trading” in finance (Barberis and Shleifer, 2003), among others. What is
common to these theories is the notion that diffusion/adoption of an innovation behaves like
9
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epidemics, consistently with the dynamics of figure 4. That is, agents have an adoption threshold
that is a positive function of the number of other adopters; an early formalisation of this idea is the
Bass model (Bass, 1969).
What about green technology adoption, specifically? In a paper focussed on establishing
whether a tipping point exists for the adoption of climate policies by the international community,
Heal and Kunreuther (2012) offer illustrative evidence on the role of early adopters (i.e. those
located at the left x-axis corner in figure 4) in triggering a global shift from damaging pollutants
usage to greener alternatives. The first one concerns the adoption of unleaded gasoline in
replacement of leaded gasoline; here the unilateral adoption by the United States meant that the
subsequent adoption costs for other countries was confined to modifying refinery capacity, since
motor industries exporting to the U.S. had to transition to lead-free fuel immediately after the move.
Thanks to these reduced costs for the followers, the new technology spread quickly worldwide. The
second example refers to phasing out chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), a spectacular achievement of the
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer.1 In this case, the U.S. decision to
sign the Montreal Protocol hinged on a technological innovation by Du Pont, the world’s largest
producer of CFCs, allowing the company to gain from elimination of CFCs. Again, strategic
complementary led most countries to phase-out ozone-depleting chemicals.
Empirical work has also established the relevance of the S-shaped curve for the diffusion and
adoption of new technologies. Ryan and Gross (1943) and Griliches (1957) demonstrated that the
adoption of hybrid corn seeds among Iowa farmers follow the pattern presented in figure 4. More
recently, Weir and Knight (2004) find a significant role of schooling, mediated by social networks,
in the adoption and diffusion of innovations using data from Ethiopia. Specifically, they suggest
that literate farmers are early adopters of new farming practices as well as quick at imitating
innovations by others, while illiterate farmers tend to be second-movers and eventually adopt the
practices of the innovators. Other studies have looked at the spread of financing techniques. For
example, Banerjee et al. (2013) study how participation in a microfinance program diffuses through
social networks in several rural villages in South India.
3.1.1 Networks and the Diffusion of Green Technologies
Much of the theory cited in this section, while insightful about the non-linearity of diffusion
dynamics, is silent about the topology and the role of the network. This, however, is relevant for the
above empirical studies and Environmental Economics more broadly. Even more so when, over
space and time, both the rate of innovation and the rate of imitation are likely to vary, in contrast to
the constant rates assumed in the Bass model (1969). A theory that aims at investigating the patterns
of early adoption/quick imitation by certain groups of farmers relative to others (c.f. Weir and
Knight, 2004), will need to allow for heterogeneity both in these rates and in the structure of social
relations.
To appreciate the role of the network, one needs to consider that the incentives to innovate and
adopt may be affected by peer and neighbourhood effects, which can drastically change the way
innovations diffuse relative to a model where individuals update their adoption decision based on
the overall frequency of adopters. Jackson (2010, p. 257) notes that ‘[…] interactive considerations
1

As of September 2013, 197 countries have ratified the Protocol, banning the production of chlorofluorocarbons,
halons, and other ozone-depleting chemicals.

10
http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper869

10

Currarini et al.: Network Economics and the Environment: Insights and Perspect

require game-theoretic reasoning, adapted and extended to a network setting.’ As an example of the
complex link between neighbourhood composition and behaviour, he refers to the choice of
software: if one wants it to be compatible with most neighbours, the ensuing interactions must be
treated as a coordination game, where adoption by a critical number of neighbours can tip the
system to a different technology.
What is important here is the fact that the speed and the extent of diffusion are intimately related
to the network topology. A vast literature on diffusion and contagion in social networks has
enriched the Bass model by explicitly modelling the component structure of a network. As an
illustration, consider the SIS (Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible) model of infection diffusion, in
which agents are born healthy, get infected with some probability and with some probability
recover, after which they become susceptible of infection again. The probability that an agent gets
infected is proportional to its degree (number of meetings), to the probability that a neighbour is
infected, and to the rate of disease transmission, measuring how infectious the disease is. One can
show that both the speed of convergence to a non-zero infection steady state and the overall social
extent of the infection depend on the topology of the network (in particular, on its degree
distribution), and how this topology relates to the rate of transmission (see Jackson 2010).
More specifically, an increase in average degree caused by a first order stochastic dominance
shift in the degree distribution always increases the speed of diffusion and the steady state share of
infected agents. This result has a very natural intuition: more connections result in more intense
social interaction and in a faster spread of the disease. A more subtle effect obtains as a result of
second order stochastic dominance shifts in the degree distribution, that essentially increase the
fraction of agents with very small and with very large degrees. An increase in the fraction of little
connected agents should slow down diffusion, while more numerous well connected agents should
speed it up, resulting in an ambiguous trade-off. The net effect depends on the topology of the
network and on how this topology combines with the degree of infectiousness of the disease can be
explained as follows. A spread of the degree distribution results in an increase in diffusion when the
rate of transmission of the disease is large, and in a decrease when the rate is low. An intuition for
this result comes from the non-linear relation between a node’s degree and its probability of
infection rate: already high infection rates are little sensitive to increases in a node’s degree, simply
because infection rates are bounded above. With large transmission rates, infection rates are high in
the system, and the effect of increasing the number of very connected nodes is small and dominated
by the effect of increasing the number of little connected nodes. The implicit non linearity in the
relationship between degree and the infection rate also implies, for specular arguments, that when
the infection is little aggressive a spread in the degree distribution increases the speed of diffusion,
as the effect of more nodes with large degree dominates the effect of more nodes with very small
degree.
Interestingly, similar insights characterize problems where agents take actions strategically and,
as in the diffusion model, the probability of taking an action increases with the share (or number) of
neighbours taking that same action. Here, as in SIS model, more connections imply faster diffusion;
moreover, a mean preserving spread of the degree distribution implies faster diffusion when the
incentives to adopt are very sensitive to the degree of an agent – a similar condition to the one we
saw in the SIS model, where the rate of transmission had to be very sensitive to the degree. A
notable difference between the strategic model of adoption and the SIS model is that conditions for
large scale spread apply to the size of the initial adopters, which has to exceed a given threshold in
order for diffusion to kick off.
11
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All this suggests that the process of adoption of new technologies is crucially affected by the
topology of social relations, and different topologies may imply very different thresholds and limit
behaviour of the system, even if all other fundamentals are the same. In the next subsection we
discuss the effect of local interaction in a diffusion problem for a socio-ecological system.
3.1.2 Networks in coupled socio-ecological systems
As an example of the additional insights that modelling networked interactions can bring to the
study of behavioural diffusion in environmental problems, consider the evolution of cooperative
behaviour in resource harvesting. Tavoni et al. (2012) and Lade et al. (2013) explored the
effectiveness of social sanctioning of resource overuse in promoting sustainable extraction. Two
types of agents, norm-following co-operators (C) limiting their resource use to the societal efficient
amount, and defectors (D) who extract above the sustainable level, interact in a well-mixed
population (i.e. absent a network structure which restricts interactions). Either type, when randomly
matched with a fellow user of the shared resource, updates his or her strategy based on utility
differences.
𝑒!
  𝑈! = 𝜋!    =    𝐹 − 𝑤𝑒!
𝐸
𝑒!
  𝜋! = 𝐹 − 𝑤𝑒!   
𝐸
𝑈! =   𝜋! − 𝜔 𝑓!

𝜋! − 𝜋!
𝜋!

where:
- the extractive efforts for the two types are 𝑒! < 𝑒! = 𝜇𝑒! (𝜇 > 1; it follows that 𝜋! < 𝜋! );
- production 𝐹 = 𝛾𝐸 ! 𝑅! results from the two inputs: resource R and mean extractive effort in
the population 𝑁;
- 𝑓! is the share of C in the population;
- 𝐸 = 𝑁[𝑓! 𝑒! + 1 − 𝑓! 𝑒! ]. 𝑤 is the opportunity cost of labour;
- 𝜔(𝑓! ) is a nonlinear ostracism function which only kicks in for a sufficiently large share of
co-operators and saturates as 𝑓! → 1, similar to the S-shaped curve in figure 4. Below a
certain threshold percentage of co-operators, their community is ineffective in sanctioning
norm violators.
Social and resource dynamics are coupled, so that payoffs from harvesting vary depending on
the composition of the population 𝑓! : the higher the share of defectors (the  lower  𝑓! ), the more
depleted the resource and the less effective the sanctions. The population composition evolves
according to the replicator dynamics, and the probability that an agent switches its strategy is
proportional to the difference between his utility and that of the matched individual.
The results of this a-spatial model, where everyone interacts with everyone else, are displayed in
figure 5 for varying degrees of the parameter 𝜇 . 2 Three regimes of stationary state of the
2

The arrows in the figure indicate the direction in which the composition of the population evolves, so that one can
determine which equilibrium obtains for a given initial share of co-operators (and level of defection by norm-violators).

12
http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper869

12

Currarini et al.: Network Economics and the Environment: Insights and Perspect

evolutionary dynamics obtain: (i) the defector equilibrium (when the dynamics tend to the left of
the figure and 𝑓!
𝑓!

0); (ii) the co-operator equilibrium (on the right hand side of the figure, where

1); and (iii) the mixed equilibrium where both C and D coexist.

The thinner lines in figure 5 show corresponding results for a model with local interaction where
individuals only observe agents in their neighbourhood, thus allowing to study the influence of
network structure on the effectiveness of social sanctions (this is taken from Chung et al., 2013).
Here, the effect of the sanctions imposed on a norm violator is assumed to depend exclusively on
the fraction of co-operators in the defector’s neighbourhood.3 In a regular network of 50 nodes, the
figure considers average degrees of k=40 (solid curve), k = 20 (dashed curve), k = 10 (dotted curve)
and k = 2 (dash-dotted curve). We observe that as average degree declines, the basin of attraction of
the co-operator equilibrium shrinks, paving the way for a ‘tragedy of the commons’.

Figure 5 Co-existence of co-operators and defectors in a wellmixed population (thick solid curve) and in regular networks
with decreasing average degree. Source: Chung et al., 2013.
This insight stresses the importance of explicitly modelling social interactions within networks:
while conclusions from the model where different appropriators interact in a well-mixed population
hold true in the case of a complete network (and qualitatively for networks with high average
degree), cooperation is destabilised in loosely connected networks.
3.2 Access and Use of Natural Resources
The access and distribution of natural resources often entails the use of networked infrastructures
and markets. This is the case, for instance, of irrigation water and natural gas. In these examples,
the cost and benefits from the use of the resource is determined by the pattern of canals and
pipelines through which this is sourced and distributed. The efficient use of the resource calls for
agreements and contracts between the nodes of the network, whose gains and benefits are
determined through complex bargaining processes. The network itself is, to some extent, flexible, as
3 This is in contrast to the well-mixed population, where all defectors are subject to the same amount of ostracism.
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new links can be created and existing links destroyed in pursue of larger profits. The incentives to
form or delete a link may well not align with social incentives, as the formation only requires the
consent of the two interested nodes, and the deletion often only requires the consent of one of the
interested nodes. Due to network externalities, inefficient networks may result from the
decentralized formation of links, and a general tension between efficiency and stability has been
recognized in early works of network economics (see Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996). Two issues
seem to be of prominent interest for the application of network economics to natural resources: how
players will share the gains from cooperation through bargaining, and how this will affect, and be
affected, by the degree of flexibility of the network and the incentives to form and delete links.
In this section we discuss these issues using, as an illustrative example, the case of the Eurasian
natural gas pipelines. Eurasian gas accounts for 40% of EU gas imports, and most of these imports
transit through Belarus or Ukraine, both importing gas from the Russian Federation.

Figure 6 Eurasian pipeline gas network. Source: Hubert and Cobanli
(2012, 2010
A striking example of the stark consequences of failures in the bargaining process is provided by
the 2009 crisis, where the disagreement on gas prices and fees led to interruptions of supply through
Ukraine for several weeks (see Hubert and Cobanli, 2012). Such retaliatory behaviour can be
viewed as an attempt to build-up bargaining power out of strategic and vital positions in the
transmission network. In general, players’ bargaining power (and, with it, their final payoff) will
depend on their position in the pipeline network, together with other factors such as market size,
production capacity and international power. Recent contributions in network theory have provided
a framework to study bargaining processes among agents located on a network. These are mainly
buyer-seller networks, in which a player bargaining power depends, in a complex manner, on her
connections to other nodes on other side of the market, and on the connections of these nodes.
However, distribution networks generally have a more complex structure than buyer-seller
networks. Specifically, they are characterized by directed links and present strong heterogeneities
among players; incorporating these features within a fully-fledged non cooperative bargaining
model is a challenging, yet necessary task for future research.
Adopting an alternative approach, based on cooperative game theory, Hubert and Cobanli
(2012) have studied the specific problem of Eurasian gas pipelines network. This approach relies on
14
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a variation of the Shapely Value for games with a communication structure, that is, games where
agents’ cooperation possibilities are described by a network. This variant, first proposed by
Myerson (1977), is based on a description of coalitional values that take into account the limits to
cooperation imposed by the fixed network structure. Using the notation developed in section 2, we
let 𝑔|! be the sub-network obtained by only considering nodes in S and those links for which at
least one of the involved nodes belongs to S. Let also 𝐶(𝑔|! ) be the set of components of 𝑔|! , and
let 𝜋(𝑔|! ) be the partition obtained by considering the set of nodes of the components in 𝐶(𝑔|! ).
Given a primitive characteristic function 𝑣(𝑆) describing the payoff possibilities of each coalition S,
we can define the new value function 𝑣! = !∈!(!|! )   𝑣(𝐵). This function captures the fact that
players without links in g are not able to coordinate their actions unless indirectly connected by
other players who transmit the necessary information. So, the coalition S is only able to generate a
value equal to the sum of values generated by its connected components. The marginal
contributions that enter the computation of the Shapley value are, of course, affected by the
network. In particular, players who are vital for many connected components, end up having very
large marginal contributions and, therefore, a large Shapley value. This, in turns, implies that
players who act as connectors in the network will be allocated a relatively large share of the
aggregate payoff. Within the context of the Eurasia pipeline network, the resulting allocation rule is
such that those countries that, if removed from the network, would impede the flow of gas from
sources to users, such as Belarus and Ukraine, have a strong bargaining power.
The outlined relation between the network architecture and players’ bargaining power can help
interpret recent developments in the (planned) infrastructures of gas distribution. These include: (i)
the offshore twin-pipeline Nord Stream, which establishes a direct link between Russia and
Germany through the Baltic Sea; (ii) the South Stream pipeline, providing a direct connection
between Russia and Bulgaria, from where gas should flow to Central Europe, Italy and Turkey; and
(iii) the Nabucco project which should open a corridor through Turkey, thus connecting Europe to
new suppliers in the Middle East and the Caspian region. If implemented, these projects would
considerably weaken the bargaining position of Belarus and Ukraine, reshaping the power along the
network at the advantage of Russia and Europe. In terms of network economics, the very fact that
these projects are being planned or undertaken suggest that the current configuration of pipelines
does not constitute a “pairwise stable” network architecture (see Jackson and Wolinksy, 1996). This
notion of stability would in fact require that no pair of nodes has an incentive to bear the cost of a
new link, and that no node find it profitable to cut any of its links. As in the case of the newly
planned pipelines, such incentives are determined by the expectation of a new payoff allocation
following the creation or deletion of a link. This makes clear that a better understanding of the
economics and strategy of networked resources would call for an analysis of network formation,
itself based on a careful assessment of incentives to form and sever link, of the associated costs and
gains in bargaining power, and of the consequences for the system as a whole. This seems to be a
challenging and exciting area for future research.
3.3 Common-pool Resource Management and Governance
The collective management of natural resources is increasingly being recognised as a critical
dimension of sustainable development and a key determinant of economic performance, especially
in the rural sector of developing economies (Platteau, 1991; Balland and Platteau, 1996; Ostrom,
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2003; Bardhan et al., 2006). By its nature, collective action involves interdependency among
individuals. For example, the maintenance of an irrigation network requires the stabilization of the
rims and the desalting of minor channels across farmers' land. In such contexts, the effort of one
farmer is likely to influence the activity of other farmers along the network, thus implying strategic
interactions among individual users. This interdependency, combined with the non-excludable and
rival nature of many natural resources, poses significant challenges and raises the question of
whether individuals are capable to coordinate their action and successfully manage resources held
in common.
The conventional theory of collective action – centred on the powerful metaphors of the tragedy
of the commons (Hardin, 1968), the Prisoner's Dilemma game, and the free-riding problem (Olson,
1965) – offered a pessimistic yet influential answer to this question. Indeed, Hardin's conclusion
that the users of a common resource are "locked into a system that compel [them] to increase its use
without limit" has for long dominated the way in which social scientists thought about shared
resources, and been interpreted as an argument in favour of privatization and central government
control (Ostrom et al., 1999).
Over the past decades, significant advancements have been made in the collective action
literature and the earlier conventional wisdom is no longer regarded as the only relevant view.
Using multiple methods of analysis, scholars from different disciplines and backgrounds have
shown that the tragedy of the commons is not inevitable, and individuals have the potentials to act
collectively.4
Recognition that collective action is possible has, in turn, shifted the attention of more recent
research towards the question of why collective action emerges and under which conditions it is
more likely to succeed or fail. Within this context, a number of structural variables have been
identified as critical for the successful management of common-pool resources. These include
institutional arrangements concerning monitoring, sanctions and accountability; group
characteristics related to size, levels of wealth, and social capital; and attributes of the resource
system, such as well-defined boundaries, unpredictability of resource flows, and resource mobility.
As noted by Agrawal (2001), while the first two sets of variables – i.e. institutional
arrangements and group characteristics – have been studied extensively at both theoretical and
empirical level, our understanding of factors related to resource characteristics is still relatively
limited. Yet the physical complexity of natural resources may have important implications for
whether and how users can sustain effective institutions. For example, as water moves through a
landscape, hydrological attributes such as quantity, quality, location and timing, are likely to be
influenced by land use and vegetation patterns. The interconnected nature of the hydrological cycle,
thus, implies that many actors and sectors influence water resources at different geographic scales
and administrative levels of governance.
Another aspect that characterises many resource problems yet fled the attention of the literature
is the multiplicity of commons. Most models assume that there exists a single source exploited by
many users. In fact, the most representative commons (e.g. forests, pastures, and groundwater
resources) are local, but numerous. The multiplicity of sources can raise interesting political and
economic questions. For example, the severe drought that affected Spain in 2006-2007 led the
4

Examples of cooperative behaviour have been identified in a wide range of contexts. These include the management
of fisheries (e.g., Acheson, 2003; Singleton, 1999), forests (e.g., Mckean, 1986, 2000; Schoonmaker Freudnberger
1993), pastures (e.g., Gilles et al. 1992; Netting, 1981; Nugent and Sanchez, 1999), and groundwater resources (e.g.,
Blomquist 1992; Trawick, 2003; Marchiori et al., 2012).
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government to consider the possibility of transferring water from the north to the south through the
construction of new pipelines. This proposal gave rise to a political debate about regional and
national sovereignty over water resources, and the potential economic and environmental
consequences of water transfers.
Advancing our understanding of the socio-ecological complexities associated with commonpool resource management requires the consideration of geographic and social distances, and the
analysis of how localised interactions give rise to larger-scale patterns that can both facilitate and
hamper collective action. Network economics is particularly suited for this purpose, and can help to
systematically analyse the structural characteristics underpinning many common-pool resource
problems.
3.3.1 Networks of commons
A first important step towards the analysis of common-pool resource problems with multiple
sources was recently made by İlkiliҫ (2011). In this paper, the author considers a situation in which
n (water) sources 𝑠! , 𝑠! , … , 𝑠! and m cities 𝑐! , 𝑐! , … , 𝑐! are embedded in a network that links cities
with sources. Figure 7 provides an example of possible network structures in the case of two cities
and two sources. The first graph, describes a complete network where each user is linked with both
sources, while in the second graph, 𝑐! is connected only to 𝑠! .

g1

g2

Figure 7 Two different networks of two cities and two sources
ssssources
The cities receive a value from consumption of the resource, but extraction is costly. The benefits
associated with water consumption are assumed to be a concave function of the total extraction
made by the city; the cost of extraction from a given source is a convex function of the total
extractions from that source. Specifically, city 𝑗’s utility takes the following form:
𝑢! 𝑄! = 𝑞! −

!!!
!

−

!! ∈!! (!! ) 𝑞!" 𝑞! .
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where 𝑞!" is the amount of water extracted by city 𝑐! from source 𝑠! , 𝑞! is the total amount extracted
by 𝑐! , and 𝑞! is the total amount extracted from source 𝑠! . Note that each city’s extraction from a
given source has a negative cost externality on all other users of that same source.
Within this setting, the paper first analyses the non-cooperative extraction game where users
freely decide how much to extract from each source they are connected to, and then characterises
the efficient use of sources. In the extraction game, a city’s exploitation of a given source turns out
to be proportional to the Bonacich centrality of the link connecting the city to that source.5
Consider, for instance, the two cities-two sources case of figure 7. It can be shown that, if the
∗
∗
∗
∗
network structure is as in graph g1 , the link flows at equilibrium are 𝑞!!
= 𝑞!"
= 𝑞!"
= 𝑞!!
= 0.2.
Furthermore, and consistent with intuition, these are equivalent to the equilibrium extraction levels
in the case of a single common source. That is, a complete network adds no complexity to the
standard problem of commons. By contrast, if the network is incomplete as in 𝑔! , the extraction
∗
∗
∗
levels at equilibrium are 𝑞!!
= 0.2857, 𝑞!"
= 0.1429, and 𝑞!!
= 0.2857. In this case, 𝑐! – which
is now connected only to 𝑠! – exploits this source more than in the complete network. This, in turn,
makes the extractions from 𝑠! more costly, leading 𝑐! to consume less water from this source and
rely relatively more on her exclusive connection 𝑠! . Hence the absent link between 𝑐! and 𝑠! harms
both 𝑐! (which is lacking the link) and 𝑐! (the city she shares the source with 𝑐! ).
More generally, in a common-pool resource game with multiple sources, a user’s extraction at a
source does not only depend on the number of users it shares it with. It also depends on the number
of sources that these other users are linked to; and on the number of users that sources are linked to,
and so on. That is, the externalities diffuse through the network ad infinitum.
From a policy perspective, the analysis suggests that disregarding the structure of the network
may be misleading because different structures affect both overall extraction levels and the
distribution of the resource across users and sources. Going back to the previous example, the
complete network 𝑔! leads to relatively higher overall water consumption. However, the incomplete
structure 𝑔! is such that 𝑠! is exploited more severely. This, in turn, may have implications for both
the urgency and type of intervention depending on how close to the point of non-recovery is the
resource as a whole, and on the ecological and socio-economic importance of different sources
within the network.
The topology of the network also matters for the efficient use of the various sources. First, the
paper shows that all efficient allocations are characterized by the same aggregate extractions source
by source and city by city. More importantly, it turns out that the efficient used of water in a given
network is equivalent to the efficient use that would result by partitioning cities and sources into
independent “regions”. Each region would comprise a subset of cities together with the sources to
which these cities have access in the network, and within each region the aggregate water use from
each source would be the same as if the region was internally fully connected. This conclusion
seems to support a management approach based on the creation of distinct and independent areas of
water exploitation, where subsets of cities have exclusive access to a subset of sources.
A number of salient issues seem to deserve further investigation within this framework. In
particular: (i) What networks are socially efficient in a world where links are costly? (ii) What are
5

Note that while in the traditional model of games on networks, where each node is a player, equilibrium behaviour
relates to the Bonacich centrality of nodes (see Ballester et al., 2006), here the equilibrium relates to the Bonacich
centrality of links. This is due to the fact that the city-to-source network is bipartite and only the nodes in one of the two
independent sets (the cities) are strategic players.
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the incentives of individual cities to form links to sources? And are individual incentives to form
and sever links aligned with social ones, as in other network-based allocation problems, such as in
Kranton and Minehart (2001); (iii) How would the predictions change if sources were linked to one
another (think, for example, of the complex connections between groundwater and surface water);
(iv) What is the effect of considering heterogeneous cities and sources?
3.3.2 Multi-level governance in the water sector
As previously mentioned, the governance of water resources is an inherently complex process due
to both the interconnectedness of the hydrological cycle and the many actors and sectors that affect
water resources at multiple scales.
Responses to water problems are often too narrow and largely based on top-down centralised
approaches, which are generally poorly suited to deal with the socio-political and ecological
complexities that underpin water use and management (Pretty and Ward, 2001; Molle et al, 2007).
At the same time, new frameworks for governing water have started to emerge, which see national
governments increasingly devolving decision-making responsibility to local authorities and
encouraging stakeholders’ participation. The underlying rationale is that involving actors at
different scales can lead to improved accountability of stakeholders, higher legitimacy of the
decisions, and management strategies that are better adapted to local conditions (e.g. Marchiori et
al., 2012).
These ideas are captured in the concepts of co-management, multi-level governance, and
decentralization which have emerged and been widely applied in the environmental policy
literature. Researchers within these fields distinguish between a ‘vertical’ and a ‘horizontal’
dimension of governance, where the former refers to the linkages between higher and lower levels
of government, including their institutional, financial, and informational aspects; while the latter
refers to cooperative arrangements between a range of public and private actors in the formulation
and adoption of development strategies.
In the field of environmental economics, on the other hand, game theory and bargaining theory
have provided a valuable framework for studying the strategic incentives of individual decisionmakers, the features of the bargaining process, and the properties of negotiated solutions to water
allocation and management problems (see for a review Carraro et al. 2007). This strand of literature
has significantly advanced our understanding of the potential of participatory approaches, and
helped to identify the challenges associated with their implementation in practice. However,
bargaining models generally neglect the structural pattern of relations between individuals,
organisations and other social actors that influence water resources at different scales. As shown by
recent research, the topology of social networks may have a significant impact on how actors
actually behave and their abilities to sustain cooperative governance arrangements (Bodin et al.,
2006; Newman and Dale, 2005; Wasserman and Faust, 1994). By explicitly modelling the structure
of social and economic relations, network analysis can usefully complement existing approaches
and help to tease apart how localised interactions give rise to larger-scale patterns that can both
enhance or hinder water governance initiatives.
Using a network approach to investigate how activities connected to water are governed entails,
first of all, identify all the actors that directly and indirectly influence the complex of water
resources, and map their formal and informal relations. Direct influence means that an actor directly
modifies water flows through withdrawals and discharge activities, flow control measures and land
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use. Other actors may exert an indirect influence by affecting the activities of those who use water
directly. Think, for example, of a governmental body that provides funding for the construction of a
new irrigation scheme. The relational ties between actors may be of different nature and involve
funding, information and knowledge exchange, and collaboration (e.g. in water maintenance
activities). Figure 8 provides a stylised representation of a multi-level governance network of actors
operating at different scales and affecting water flows through different activities.6

Figure 8 A network of actors operating at different scales and
interacting with the complex of green and blue water sources and
flows. Source: Ernstson et al. (2010)

To date, empirical research applying quantitative network analysis to natural resource governance is
still very limited. Yet, some valuable insights and hypotheses have started to emerge in this
evolving field. One such hypothesis is that the higher the network density (i.e., the number of
existing ties divided by the number of possible ties), the more potential for collective action and
other kind of collaborations that would help actors avoid conflicts and develop effective
management strategies. Several studies in the natural resource governance literature support this
hypothesis. In the context of rural Kenya, for example, King (2000) showed that fishermen
communities characterised by a higher number of interactions among themselves and with
government officials were relatively better able to deal with a series of unfavourable developments
related to the fishery. Similar results emerge from Conley and Udry (2001)’s analysis of agricultural
practices in Ghana, where high network density is associated with the development of new
technologies and the diffusion of more sustainable management practices. As noted by Bodin and
Crona (2009), however, some caution is warranted since there is also evidence that the positive
effect of network density in natural resource governance is not necessarily monotonically
increasing. Indeed, very high tie density can lead to homogenization of information and knowledge,
which results in less efficient resource use and reduced capacity to adapt to changing conditions.
6

Figure 8 includes both ‘blue’ and ‘green’ water sources. The former consists of freshwater in rivers, lakes and
aquifers; the latter refers to the precipitation on land that does not run off or recharge the aquifers, but is stored in the
soil and sustains plant growth. An integrated approach to water management should include both since hydrological
attributes such as quantity, quality, location and timing are all influenced by land use and vegetation patterns (ADD
REF).
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Other structural characteristics affecting governance processes and outcomes include the level
of network cohesion and the degree of subgroup connectivity. Broadly speaking, network cohesion
refers to ‘the extent to which a network “hangs together” instead of being divided into separate
subgroups’ (Bodin and Crona, 2009) – see figure 9, graphs (a) and (b). When several clearly distinct
subgroups are present, the density of relational ties between groups can be regarded as low.
Relating this to the above discussion of the (mostly) positive effect of network density on
collaborative processes, one can conclude that less cohesive networks may hinder the emergence of
integrated governance initiatives. However, the formation of subgroups may also have implications
for a process deemed important for natural resource governance, namely the generation of
specialised knowledge (e.g. local ecological knowledge). The extent to which the development of
specialised knowledge is of use in governing complex ecosystems, in turn, depends on whether
stakeholders are able/willing to transfer such knowledge across subgroups (i.e. on the degree of
subgroup connectivity). Hence, network analysis can help find the right balance between an overall
structural cohesion on the one hand, and allowing for the presence of multiple subgroups on the
other.

(a)

(b)

Figure 9 Graph (a) represents a network without any clearly
distinguishable subgroups (high overall cohesiveness), while (b)
depicts a network characterised by two isolated subgroups (low
overall cohesiveness)

In addition to features of the network as a whole, it may be important to assess structural
characteristics at the level of individual actors (i.e. the nodes of the network). For example, by
occupying certain central positions in a social network, some actors may be able to critically
influence other relevant stakeholders, thus favouring (or blocking) the development of sustainable
management initiatives. There are various ways of measuring centrality in social networks. Two of
the most commonly used measures are degree centrality and betweenness centrality. The former
refers to the number of ties an actor possesses; while the latter measures the degree to which an
individual actor links other actors who would otherwise be disconnected. These measures are used
by Stein et al (2011) to identify key players in the complex social and institutional landscape
underpinning water governance in the Mkindo catchment, Tanzania. Within this context, the
network of actors that either directly or indirectly influence water flows is a diverse set of players,
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ranging from local resource users and village leaders to higher-level governmental agencies,
universities and NGOs. Results show that village leaders play a brokerage role in the network
connecting water and land related activities within their respective village and, to some extent,
across villages. The organisations with a formal mandate for the management of water resources, on
the other hand, link across larger segments of the catchment, but are not well connected to local
communities. From a policy perspective, the analysis suggests that it may be important to integrate
village leaders into formal water governance systems, and highlights the need to strengthen vertical
links between local communities and governmental bodies operating at the district level.
Reflecting on the above discussion, it is clear that the topology of a social network can
significantly influence how actors behave and their abilities to manage water and other natural
resources. As we have seen, important differences in governance processes and outcomes can be
expected among networks experiencing different degrees of cohesiveness, sub-group connectivity
and centralization. Moreover, most structural characteristics do not have a monotonically increasing
positive effect, and favouring one characteristic often comes at the expense of another. All this
raises a number of interesting issues and questions for future research; for example, what are the
‘optimal’ level and mix of different network characteristics for the effective governance of natural
resources? And how can social networks of resource users develop favourable structural
characteristics? In line with Bodin and Crona (2009), we also think that in addition to empirical
studies, more theoretical work on the role of networks in natural resource governance is needed.
Theoretical models of various behavioural characteristics can help generalise some of the results of
the case-study literature, and provide further insights into how different network structures can
emerge and evolve over time. Finally, it is important to notice that not only the structure of a
network can evolve, but also the content of what is transferred through its links can vary. For
example, a link initially used only for the exchange of some specific kind of information can evolve
into deeper social interactions, which can facilitate the formation of common norms and values. A
network perspective holds great potential in enabling the analysis of such interactions and their
direct and indirect effects on governance processes and outcomes.
3.4 Networks, Coalitions and International Agreements
In this section we discuss two issues in international cooperation that would benefit from the
explicit consideration of networks and from the application of notions developed in network
economics. In a nutshell, in section 4.4.1 we discuss new insights on the stability of cooperation
that would obtain from the explicit consideration of countries’ bilateral relations within a
cooperating coalition (here represented by a network). In section 4.4.2 we consider the process of
coalition-building through sequential bilateral contacts, and discuss the trade-offs between
centralization and delegation of these contacts.
3.4.1 The Internal Structure of Environmental Coalitions
A common, yet restrictive assumption in the economic literature of IEAs is that countries are
symmetric. When taken into consideration, asymmetries are typically modelled as differences in
terms of costs and benefits of emission abatement. However, due to their history of political,
economic and cultural interactions, countries may also differ with respect to their relationship and
role within the process of building up cooperation (see Section 4.4.2). Because of these differences,
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even within a cooperating coalition, certain countries may find it easy to communicate and agree on
proposals, while other countries may have little, if any, relations. These differences in bilateral
relations within the coalition are likely to characterize countries’ relations should the coalition break
down and, with it, their possibilities of cooperation after the break up. If, for instance, two countries
A and B manage to cooperate within a larger coalition only thanks to the mediation of a third
country C, these two countries would probably find it difficult to cooperate if C were to leave the
coalition.
To put things more formally, we associate with the environmental coalition S a set of (possibly
weighted) bilateral links, expressing, for each pair of countries in S, the strength of their diplomatic,
political and economic relationship. In the simplest case, we may think of a {0,1} undirected
network, where countries either communicate or not within S. The cornerstone of our analysis is the
mechanism described above: by describing countries’ bilateral relations, the network predicts
countries’ cooperation possibilities in case the coalition should break apart. Consider, for instance,
country 2 in the left panel of figure 10, mediating all other bilateral relations; 2’s defection from the
three-country coalition would cause a total breakdown of cooperation, as countries 1 and 3 would
not be able (or would face prohibitively high costs) to communicate. If 2 were to defect from a
coalition internally structured as in the right panel of figure 10, a smaller cooperating coalition with
1 and 3 as members would be possible.
What matters for our argument is the observation that, in the presence of spillovers, what a
country expects to obtain by defecting from a coalition crucially depends on the expected patterns
of cooperation after the defection. Free riding incentives are clearly maximal when the remaining
countries are expected to stay together and continue to cooperate. This is the so-called “delta”
assumption, and leads to the prediction of an endemic instability of cooperation when spillovers are
positive (as in the case of environmental agreements). Free riding incentive are, instead, minimized
when other countries are expected to stop cooperating altogether after a defection – the “gamma”
assumption – in which case global cooperation has been shown to be possible (see Chander and
Tulkens, 1999). By specifying the internal structure of a coalition, the network pins down countries’
expectations on post-defection scenarios, and therefore their incentives. For instance, the gamma
assumption is naturally associated with country 2’s defection in network (a) of figure 10, while the
delta assumption would appropriately describe expectations after 1’s and 3’s defections. In general,
the defection of a sub-coalition 𝑇 ⊂ 𝑆 would be followed by a partition of the remaining players
𝑁\𝑆, where each element of the partition corresponds to a component of the sub-network 𝑔|!\! .
By shaping defectors’ incentives, relational networks endow a cooperating coalition with
specific stability properties that depend on the sign of coalitional spillovers. In figure 10, for
instance, the “star” network of the left panel provides all players with lower incentive to defect
under positive spillovers, and with higher incentives under negative spillovers, than the complete
network on the right panel. More generally, adding links to a given network always has the effect of
lowering incentives to defect under negative spillovers, and of increasing these incentives under
positive spillovers. This suggests that minimally connected structures would endow the coalition
with strong stability properties under positive spillovers.
Additionally, a very sparse internal structure would also limit the possibilities of coalitional
members to coordinate on defections. In the star network of figure 10, for instance, countries 1 and
3 would not be able to coordinate on a joint defection, unless they get player 2 involved. This is not
the case in the complete network, where 1 and 3 can autonomously take joint decisions. The effect
of the network on coordination was analysed by Demange (2006) in standard cooperative games
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and by Currarini (2007) in games with spillovers. A basic insight is that, under positive spillovers,
sparse networks maximize coalitional stability by both limiting the number and the profitability of
potential defections. Things are more ambiguous under negative spillovers: while sparse networks
limit the number of potential defections, they maximize their profitability, resulting in a trade-off
that leaves space for intermediate structure with average density.

(b)

(a)

Figure 10 Internal structures of a 3-country coalition

While the above discussion stresses the role of the relational network in shaping players’ outside
options, there are other ways in which the network is likely to affect players’ bargaining power
within the coalition. In the left panel of figure 10, while under positive spillovers player 2 has a low
outside option due to limited free riding possibilities, he is nevertheless responsible for keeping the
coalition united and, therefore, for generating the gains from cooperation. This should increase its
bargaining power compared to the complete network (right panel), where 2 is not in such a pivotal
position. This is indeed recognized by various allocation rules that take account of the network,
such as the Myerson Value, an extension of the Shapley Value to cases where players’ cooperation
possibilities are described by a network. The main insight here is that while pivotal players enjoy a
stronger bargaining position under negative spillovers, a trade-off obtains under positive ones,
where pivotal players, who play an essential role within the coalition, end up facing low outside
options and, as a result, weaker bargaining power. More research in needed to fully understand the
interplay of the different roles of the network in shaping agents bargaining power, and how this
interplay affects the stability of environmental coalitions.
3.4.2 Delegation and Centralization in the Build-up of Environmental Coalitions
The traditional approaches to environmental coalitions have either overviewed the process through
which coalitions are built (adopting for instance the notion of core of a cooperative game, as in
Chander and Tulkens, 1997)), or made use of very stark models of coalition formation, in which
one coalition is formed by means of simultaneous announcements of membership (see Carraro,
Barret,). However, the process by which environmental coalitions are formed can be varied and
multifaceted, and the timing and framing of negotiations is likely to matter for the final success of
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cooperation. In particular, large coalitions are likely to be built gradually, with a limited number of
very committed members as first signatories, who then adopt various strategies to enlarge the
coalition.
In many instances of international environmental cooperation, one or more countries have in
fact played the role of perpetrators of the process, either because more inclined to solve global
environmental problems, or because traditionally playing a leading role in the international arena.
Such countries face the task of building up a larger coalition by means of several and successive
individual contacts with other perspective members, through complex negotiation processes. The
design of such bilateral contacts is a crucial element of cooperation, and attains to the timing of
such contacts, their degree of centralization and delegation, the personal involvement and
commitment of perpetrators and of perspective members. The perpetrator may, for instance, opt for
multiple and simultaneous contacts with most or the other potential members, adopting therefore a
centralized procedure of coalition building. Alternatively, it may identify a restricted set of players
to contact in a first stage of negotiation, and delegate to these players the task of further enlarging
the coalition.
Both centralization and delegation have plausible pros and cons. Advocates of centralization
would probably stress the importance of a widespread use of the authority and charisma of the
perpetrator, whose central role would be interpreted as signal of its commitment to the cooperation
process. Delegation would probably be preferred when diplomatic, geographical and historical
relations between countries are very heterogeneous, and the initial perpetrator would lack the
necessary information and/or diplomatic strength to successfully negotiate with certain potential
new members. In these cases, the perpetrator may better serve the final goal of global cooperation
by delegating the creation of new contacts.
The choice between delegation and centralization involves other, less obvious, aspects that are
strictly related to the economics of cooperation and to the resulting patterns of strategic interaction.
In this section we discuss such aspects, frame them in a stylized example of coalitional externalities,
and claim that a general analysis of these issues would greatly benefit from the use of network
formation theory and from our knowledge of strategic interdependence in networks.
To fix ideas, consider the following three-player example, developed in full detain in Currarini and
Feri (2007). A perpetrator i has the task of building up a coalition with other two players, j and k.
The benefits from cooperation are captured by a partition function v, mapping each partition of the
set of players into a vector of payoffs, specifying an aggregate payoff for each coalition in that
partition. Formally, we let v(S,π) denote the value generated by S in the partition π. In our example,
we set 𝑣({𝑖}, {𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑘}) =   𝑣({𝑗}, {𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑘}) =   𝑣({𝑘}, {𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑘}) and 𝑣({𝑖𝑗}, {𝑖𝑗, 𝑘}) =   𝑣({𝑖𝑘}, {𝑖𝑘, 𝑗}) =
  𝑣({𝑗𝑘}, {𝑖, 𝑗𝑘})  by symmetry. We also assume that the grand coalition {ijk} is efficient, by this
meaning that is generates more aggregate payoff than any other partition of the players’ set:
𝑣 123 , 123 ≥ !∈! 𝑣 𝑆, 𝜋 , ∀𝜋.
The perpetrator i designs the structure of his contacts with j and k. Either i contacts j and k
simultaneously, proposing to form a coalition of three players, or sequentially, contacting j first,
proposing him to join the forming coalition, and delegating him the task of enlarging the coalition
to k. In other words, i admits j in the coalition, and transfers to j the technology to negotiate with k.
The assumption that the perpetrator can commit not to contact agent k when delegating to agent j
the contracting power is crucial and considerably simplifies the equilibrium analysis and allows us
to get a first very sharp intuition. The two scenarios are illustrated in figure 11.
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Figure 11 Centralised (left) vs. decentralised (right)
contacts.
In the first centralized scenario, j and k simultaneously receive an offer. For both of them to accept,
the offered monetary payoff has to exceed the outside option given that the other has accepted.
These outside options are 𝑣( 𝑗 , 𝑗, 𝑖𝑘 = 𝑣( 𝑘 , 𝑘, 𝑖𝑗 . If the perpetrator delegates, then player j
needs to receive at least what he would get by rejecting the offer, which is 𝑣( 𝑗 , {𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑘}). Player
k’s payoff when contacted by j would instead be at least 𝑣( 𝑘 , {𝑖𝑗, 𝑘}, his outside option if rejecting
to join the coalition.
Summing up, the perpetrator needs to give up different slices of the total cake in the two
alternative regimes: by centralizing contacts, i gives up 𝑣( 𝑗 , 𝑗, 𝑖𝑘 + 𝑣( 𝑘 , 𝑘, 𝑖𝑗 ; by delegating,
i gives up 𝑣( 𝑗 , 𝑗, 𝑖, 𝑘 ) + 𝑣( 𝑘 , 𝑘, 𝑖𝑗 . Which regime is preferred by the perpetrator clearly
depends on whether 𝑣( 𝑗 , 𝑗, 𝑖, 𝑘 > 𝑣( 𝑗 , 𝑗, 𝑖𝑘 or, instead, 𝑣( 𝑗 , 𝑗, 𝑖, 𝑘 < 𝑣( 𝑗 , 𝑗, 𝑖𝑘 . In the
terminology of coalitional games, it depends on whether agents face negative or positive coalitional
spillovers. In particular, the perpetrator will prefer centralized contacts when spillovers are
negative, and sequential contacts when spillovers are positive. Also, when there are intrinsic
reasons to centralize contacts (based, as we said, on the perpetrator authority), there is a trade-off
between these reasons and the strategic incentives to free ride in a centralized process, and this
trade-off may be resolved in favour of delegation the stronger free riding incentives and/or the
weaker the perpetrator’s authority.
The role of externalities on outside options, bargaining power and the resulting structure of
contracts have been stressed in various papers in the contracts literature. Genicot and Ray (1999)
suggest that the presence of negative externalities may induce the principal to first contract a subset
of players, and then extend contracts to other individual players – a sort of divide and conquer
strategy. Similar insights are present in Galasso (2007). The main insight here is that the first set of
contracts has the purpose of decreasing the outside options of the remaining players, who are then
contracted at better conditions for the principal. The reason why a fully centralised structure is not
optimal in these papers is that players can coordinate before responding to the principal’s offer.
Another difference with our stylized example above is that the principal cannot commit to
transferring the contracting power to the agents. A similar mechanism underlies the analysis of
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centralized contracts with externalities by Segal (1999), where is shown that positive externalities
may induce the principal to delegate inefficiently low activity levels, in the attempt to lower agents’
outside options and retain a larger share of the social surplus. A general setting that extends the
three-player example described above to many agents is the sequential “link formation and
bargaining” game in Currarini and Morelli (2000). There, the sequential formation of links has been
shown to induce efficiency in the absence of externalities, thus overlooking the free riding
incentives and their effects on coalition formation. Also, although in that paper the principal can
decide whether to simultaneously offer a link to all agents or to delegate to the second agent in the
protocol the task to form further links, the principal cannot retain the exclusive right to propose
contract. The centralized contracting situation realizes therefore only if all agents reciprocate the
principal’s link offer and do not form links among themselves.
4 Conclusions
Network structures are relevant in many environmental problems, ranging from the diffusion of
green technologies, the management of multi-source commons, the networked access to natural
resources, to the dynamics of environmental agreements. In this paper we have discussed how
network economics can help to model and analyse a variety of these problems, and what new
insights can result. Local interaction and network structures seem to bear potential applications in
other environmental problems that we have not covered here, including multi-issues environmental
negotiations, issue linkage, trans-boundary pollution problems, biodiversity and conservation, peer
effects in health related behaviour with externalities (such as smoking), fisheries, risk assessment
and others. We hope that the present paper can stimulate research on these topics, both theoretical
and applied, explicitly embedding networks in the traditional models of environmental economics.
Some of these applications are the subject of our current research.
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